In Anticipation of Another War

Armenian News Network / Groong
February 21, 2017

By Grigor Hakobyan


SUMMARY

As the one year anniversary of the Four Day War in April of 2016 is
fast approaching so is the military escalation along the frontlines in
Artsakh gradually intensifying. Almost no week goes by without human
losses suffered on either side of the unresolved conflict. Relative
military parity established by the warring sides since last war
coupled with a cold winter and barely passable roads in the region
seemed to have deterred new Azerbaijani military aggression from
resuming thus far, however as the weather warms up in addition to
declining oil output and devaluation of the manat-Azerbaijani
currency, and new accumulations of military capabilities by
Azerbaijani military, Armenian armed forces are expecting to face yet
another violent attempt by Aliyev's government in Baku to forcefully
change the status quo on the ground either this year or within next
two years. We will examine a number of most likely scenarios for the
resumption of the war in the region and their most likely outcomes in
this article by taking into account present factors at play both
regionally and internationally.


BACKGROUND

Last year, after accumulating a vast combat arsenal Azerbaijan
embarked in a military adventure, a blitzkrieg that was meant to break
through Armenian defense lines along the line of contact and capture
Stepanakert. The plan envisioned the creation of a false impression of
Azerbaijani forces trying to take over parts of Hadrut or Mardakert
region in hopes of drawing away Armenian reserve forces from the
center of Artsakh Republic to defend its northernmost and southernmost
positions. In case of successful implementation of the first phase of
the attack, in the second phase of the attack Azerbaijani troops were
planning to cut through Askeran region by capturing Akan (Agdam) and
finally Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh Republic. However, due to
strong resistance by Armenian frontline troops along the entire line
of contact, rapid mobilization of Armenian forces and volunteers, many
of them being veterans of previous Artsakh liberation war of 1988-1994,
Azerbaijan failed to register significant progress in any direction,
but captured several positions in the north (Mardakert region) and
south (Hadrut region) of Artsakh Republic.

The Armenian artillery units were able to quickly uncover the
amassment of a large number of Azerbaijani tanks and infantry units in
the direction of Askeran Region and quickly destroyed them before they
could even launch their second phase of the assault. Additional
Azerbaijani reinforcement sent towards their positions near Askeran in
support of the previous assault units were also quickly destroyed
before they could even reach the line of contact.  Thus the
Azerbaijani blitzkrieg failed in the middle of unfolding operation,
forcing Aliyev's government to declare a unilateral cease fire and
request Russian mediation to stop the Armenian counter offensive.
Despite loud rhetoric of a quick and winning war, and utilization of
newly acquired military hardware such as modern Russian tanks (T-90s)
and modernized helicopters (Mi-24), and augmented by Israeli
"kamikaze" drones (Harop), large numbers of mercenaries from the
Middle East (ISIS) and Turkish commando units, Azerbaijan's military
offensive didn't significantly contribute to changing the status quo
on the ground but left Azerbaijani troops demoralized and in retreat
across multiple points of the contact line.


REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCE

Presently the military balance between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces
seems to be relatively even. New acquisitions of Israeli military
hardware such as Barak-8 air defense systems and upcoming Iron Dome
rocket defense systems didn't provide Azerbaijan with any significant
advantage but rather made them a priority target for the short range
Armenian ballistic cruise missiles such as Iskander-E and Elbrus which
without any doubt will be utilized in case of large scale military
hostilities resuming again in the region. Replenishment of Azerbaijani
forces with new Mi-24 combat helicopters and additional units of T-90
tanks, Solntsepek thermobaric rocket launchers, modern or recently
modernized Russian self-propelled howitzers and automatic mortar
launchers from Israel will not allow Azerbaijani forces to make a
significant dent in Armenian defenses which are well protected and
mostly located on hilltops. The terrain surrounding most of Armenian
defense positions will prohibit Azerbaijanis from utilizing tanks and
other combat machinery on a large scale despite any air coverage that
combat helicopters and attack drones may provide them.

Subsequent large arsenal of anti-tank weapons such as SPG-9, a variety
of modern RPG rounds, Kornet rockets, Armenian modifications of
European MILAN systems, and Russian supersonic Khrizantema anti-tank
missile systems are capable of nullifying Azerbaijani numerical
advantage in tanks and armor in the battlefield. Relative numeric
advantage of Azerbaijani aircrafts is not capable of playing a
significant role in a future conflict either. Long range air-defense
radars such as Nebo-M and Armenian multilayered air defense systems
made up of modernized 2K11 Krug, S-125 Neva/Pechora and S-300v4
batteries, Osa and other air-defense systems together with a number of
modern MANPADS such as different variations of Igla and new Verba are
capable of neutralizing Azerbaijani aerial threats to Armenian
forces. Newly acquired anti-drone defense systems, some of them built
in Armenia itself, serve as an additional layer of defense for
Armenian forces against aerial threats posed by "kamikaze" drones in
the possession of Azerbaijan.


INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Globally, the situation doesn't favor a resumption of war in Artsakh
either. With the election of Trump in the United States and the
subsequent shift of strategic priorities for America from Caucasus and
Central Asia to Europe, Middle East and Asia Pacific regions former
competition between Russia and the United States in the Caucasus and
Central Asia is currently on hold or greatly reduced which has
minimized chances for a military clash in the region between the two
superpowers over NATO expansion or security of oil and gas pipelines.
Now that the US is already exporting its own oil and natural gas to
the world markets in addition to the coming online of Iranian and
Iraqi oil production, the importance of Azerbaijani oil and gas
pipelines is vastly reduced. In Europe, rattled by Brexit and
overwhelming flow of large number of refugees from Middle East has
left the EU structures busy trying to keep the union together,
defending liberal values and countering the rise of right-wing parties
in Germany and France. However, that doesn't mean that Azerbaijan will
not attempt to resume the war anyways.


AZERBAIJANI DILEMMA

The next round of Azerbaijani aggression will occur most likely due to
domestic upheaval in Azerbaijan where starting war with Armenia in
hopes of scoring a few victories in the battlefield will serve to
distract Azerbaijani populace from expressing their grievances with
Aliyev's ruling regime in Baku. Falling oil prices and drying out of
oil wells will further push Aliyev's regime to unleash an all-out war
against the republics of Armenia and Artsakh if not this year then
within next two to three years. Resuming war in Artsakh will be a way
for Aliyev's regime to preserve its rule and control of Azerbaijani's
economy for another five to ten years before it is overthrown by
popular uprising within Azerbaijan. If any peace treaty is agreed upon
between Armenia and Azerbaijan the ruling regime in Baku will have no
other choice but to deal with popular discontent at home and wage war
against its own people thus bringing its own downfall perhaps sooner
than later and or otherwise. Therefore resuming war in Artsakh will be
the most expedient way for Aliyev's regime to suppress its own
domestic opposition while holding on to power longer than it actually
can.


WAR SCENARIOS AND MOST LIKELY OUTCOMES

The second scenario will most likely be south toward the center for
defense of Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh. During the second
phase of the attack Azerbaijani forces will attempt to attack the
Mardakert Region (north) and Hadrut Region (south) with overwhelming
amount of firepower and personnel to overrun Armenian positions in at
least one of the regions in hopes of occupying either the entire
region or half of the region. Under such a scenario Azerbaijani forces
will resort to utilizing large number of combat helicopters and drones
to make their way across the battlefields in an effort of achieving
one of their primary objectives-partial or full occupations of either
Mardakert or Hadrut region, if not both regions all at once. In most
likelihood, the outcome of such a scenario will be the same as first
scenario, insignificant Azerbaijani gains and large losses in
personnel and military hardware across battlefields if Armenian forces
choose not to launch a counter offensive bur rather remain in a static
defense mode.

The second scenario will most likely be the opposite of the first.
Specifically this time the first phase of the attack would come toward
the center of Artsakh across Askeran Region to draw away Armenian
reserves from the north and south toward the center for defense of
Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh. During the second phase of the
attack Azerbaijani forces will attempt to attack the Mardakert Region
(north) and Hadrut Region (south) with overwhelming amount of
firepower and personnel to overrun Armenian positions in at least one
of the regions in hopes of occupying either the entire region or half
of the region. Under such a scenario Azerbaijani forces will resort to
utilizing large number of combat helicopters and drones to make their
way across the battlefields in an effort of achieving one of their
primary objectives-partial or full occupations of either Mardakert or
Hadrut region, if not both regions all at once. In most likelihood,
the outcome of such a scenario will be the same as first scenario,
insignificant Azerbaijani gains and large losses in personnel and
military hardware across battlefields if Armenian forces choose not to
launch a counter offensive bur rather remain in a static defense mode.

The third most likely scenario will amount to an all-out war across
two lines of contact, one in Artsakh and another one in Nakhichevan
autonomous region. Under such scenario most populated towns and
villages of the Republic of Armenia including Yerevan, the capital of
Armenia will become a target for Azerbaijani rocket-artillery
forces. Large scale movements of Azerbaijani infantry and tank
formations across Ararat valley in an attempt to cut Yerevan-Goris-
Stepanakert highway passing near Yerasxavan would be part of such a
scenario. Breakout of war in Nakhichevan will most likely draw Turkey
and Russia into the conflict where Iran will become a wild card. Iran
may choose to join either one of the warring parties or make their own
attempt to take over the province under the guise of reestablishing
stability in the province or inserting their own peace-keeping forces
as the only neutral power in the region capable of mediating between
the two warring parties. Under the third scenario the attack from
Nakhichevan will take place in conjunction with one of the previous
two war scenarios discussed previously.

Without any questions such an attack from Nakhichevan will force the
Armenian military to counter attack and in case of a successful
offensive, to take over the entire province. The outcome of such a
scenario will be most devastating to Armenia unless Armenia decides to
take preventive measures by carrying out preemptive strikes in
Nakhichevan and taking over the province in the early days of the
war. For Armenia it will become imperative to seal the open border
between Nakhichevan and Turkey to prevent incursion of Turkish troops
into the province and their further advancement toward densely
populated Armenian towns, including Yerevan. Under such a war
scenario, in light of overwhelming attack by Azerbaijani forces, the
Armenian side will be forced to target Azerbaijani's critical
infrastructure to force Azerbaijan to capitulate.

For Azerbaijan, the outcome of third war scenario would be a large
number of devastated oil refineries and oil rig platforms, railroads,
oil and gas pipelines, destroyed Mingechaur dam, and devastated cities
of Khazakh, Barda, Tartar, Gandzak (Gyanja) and number of other
frontline towns and villages along the line of contact. Just the
destruction of Mingechaur dam will cause the flooding of nearly a
quarter of Azerbaijan's territory laying in close proximity to the Kur
River. The flooding of towns and villages, and military positions
along the Kur River would cut off Azerbaijani military installations
from their mainland to the east of Kur River allowing the Armenian
troops to kill or capture nearly all Azerbaijani troops located to the
west of the Kur River. In most likelihood, Azerbaijan will lose
another region or a number of regions to Armenian counter offensive.
Concurrently in Baku, just like it happened during the first
Armenian-Azerbaijani war in early 1990s, another military revolt will
violently overthrow Aliyev's regime in Baku and send the ruling family
into either exile or prison. Additionally, the unfolding of this war
scenario would result in tens of thousands of casualties on both sides
of the conflict and a new wave of refugees rushing into neighboring
countries, including Russia, Central Asia and Europe.


CONCLUSIONS

Under any of the abovementioned scenarios significant loss of life and
military hardware would be unavoidable. Although Azerbaijani defeat
under the first and second war scenarios is nearly guaranteed, the
third scenario is most likely to be the most devastating for
Armenia. The third scenario has the potential of spilling out from the
confines of the southern Caucasus region and involving Middle Eastern
powers such as Turkey and Iran in the conflict. The prolongation of
such a scenario may also put Russia and NATO on a course of collision
and sparking a world war between major and minor powers each trying to
redraw the Middle East to fit their own strategic interests. Such an
outcome may also extend to a clash between major Asian nuclear powers
such as China, India, the Koreas, and Pakistan in one way or another
who will consider a world war across continents as an opportunity to
solve their own domestic and regional security problems. Therefore it
is imperative both for regional powers and world powers to prevent a
resumption of the war in the region by supporting the overthrow of
Aliyev's regime in Baku and helping to bring democratic forces in
Azerbaijan to power. Perhaps only then peaceful negotiations through
mutual compromises will make more sense and bear fruit. Until then, as
long as Aliyev's clan is in charge of Azerbaijan, resumption of yet
another war in the region is nearly inevitable. It is only a matter of
time, not a matter of possibility.


RECOMMENDATIONS

To best withstand the next wave of Azerbaijani military aggression it
is imperative to raise the military preparedness of each Armenian
soldier. Specifically, every Armenian soldier should undergo grueling
special forces training including effective hand-to-hand combat and
survival techniques, be able to utilize more than one weapon,
including anti-tank weapons and air-defense weapons. Furthermore, last
year a number of soldiers after running out of bullets had to resort
to self-sacrifice by blowing themselves up with a hand grenade to
avoid getting captured and tortured by Azerbaijani forces. Therefore
it is only prudent to increase the firepower of every Armenian soldier
by providing each one of them, especially those serving on the
frontline with a personal weapon for self-defense, a powerful handgun
with armor piercing bullets capable of penetrating body armor in
situations of close-quarter combat. Additionally, it is necessary for
Armenia to introduce and integrate new autonomous and semi-autonomous
combat robots to the frontline to maximize the firepower of the
frontline troops. Setting up an additional layer of self-defense by
creating a national guard made up of local residents of the frontline
towns and villages under the command of Armenia's MOD need to be
implemented with haste.


--
Grigor Hakobyan is an independent political analyst residing in
Phoenix, AZ, and a former ANCA Fellow in Washington D.C. He is the
founder of a virtual think tank called Ararat Institute for Near Eastern
Studies. He was also a freelance writer for the Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute of John Hopkins University and has interned in Congress for Rep.
Brad Sherman, researching ethnic conflicts and terrorism in Russia,
Caucasus and Central Asia. Grigor also completed an internship at the
International Center for Terrorism Studies of the Potomac Institute for
Policy Studies where he researched international terrorist networks
operating in the Caucasus and Central Asia, preparing congressional
briefings for the Director of ICTS on WMDs. Grigor holds a B.A. in
Political Science from Arizona State University.